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CARROLL V. COMMISSIONER: NARROW JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE' § 7502 MAY CAUSE INCREASED
BURDEN ON TAXPAYERS
2
The marvel of all history is the patience with which men and women submit
to burdens unnecessarily laid upon them by their governments. 3
I. INTRODUCTION
"The Carroll case is just one of the latest reminders that if you live in sec-
ond or sixth circuits it can be very dangerous to file your [federal income tax]
return using U.S. regular mail...." Although most of the tax law is enacted and
amended by Congress, significant tax law has developed through judicial inter-
pretation of ambiguously-worded statutes.5 The Federal Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal decisions interpreting these statutes frequently conflict, creating a split of
authority and possible inconsistent results for taxpayers based solely upon their
choice of residence.6 Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter I.R.C.) § 7502,
"Timely mailing treated as timely filing" (hereinafter referred to as the statutory
"mailbox rule"),7 has engendered such a split in authority relating to the judi-
cial construction of the term "filed"8 and the application of a common law pre-
1. Unless otherwise noted, all section references in this Note are to the Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.) of 1986 as amended.
2. See James M. Poterba, Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden?, 46 NATIONAL TAX REVIEW
539 (1993) ((reviewing Don Fullerton and Diane Lim Rogers book of the same title (1993)
and arguing that analysts of tax policies should measure any positive and negative effects of
these policies over a taxpayer's lifetime rather than only on an annual basis).
3. Attributed to William E. Borah.
4. Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996, at I (commenting that the Supreme
Court or Congress should address the issue so all taxpayers will be treated consistently).
5. James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules And The Decline Of The Courts-In The Law Of
Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 265 (1995).
6. According to the Golsen Rule as established in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742,
757 (1970), aff'd 445 F. 2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tax Court must follow the court of
appeals that has direct jurisdiction [usually established by taxpayer's residence] over the
taxpayer in question and the Tax Court may only decide a case on its own interpretation if the
court of appeals that has jurisdiction over the taxpayer has not ruled on the matter. The split
results when circuit courts disagree on tax issues and the Tax Court (a national court) is
bound by that court of appeals that has direct jurisdiction over the taxpayer in question: thus,
the Tax Court may reach opposite decisions, based upon identical facts, for taxpayers based
solely upon the taxpayer's geographical area. Kenneth Ryesky, Analysis Of The Split Authority
On Proof Of A Postmark Under Internal Revenue Code § 7502, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 379,
415 n.4 (1996).
7. See text of I.R.C. § 7502 at note 31 infra. This section is commonly referred to as the
I.R.C.'s "mailbox rule," although the critical element in this statute is the application of a
postmark rather than the depositing of the envelope in the mail. Id § 7502 (a).
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sumption of delivery upon proof of mailing to that statute.9
In Carroll v. Commissioner, 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit upheld the minority viewpoint that the statute repeals the common
law presumption of delivery in all cases other than those where the taxpayer
used registered or certified mail."I Thus, taxpayers who do not send tax docu-
ments using registered or certified mail must bear the risk of nondelivery. 12
Critics of this decision contend that the court misinterpreted the I.R.C. 13 As a
result of the court's narrow interpretation, taxpayers may suffer substantial tax
losses and penalties even when a document is lost through no fault of their
own.
14
Generally, this Casenote analyzes the Carroll court's decision to remain
in the minority of circuits in relation to the issue presented. Part II discusses the
statutory history and case law decisions that have affected it.' 5 Part III exam-
ines the facts of the case, procedural history, and holding of the majority. 16 Part
IV will examine the Carroll court's analysis of established precedent on this
ambiguous section and the merits of the arguments of other courts that have
adopted a broader interpretation of I.R.C. § 7502.17 Moreover, this Note will
investigate the purpose of §7502 and how the results in Carroll are inconsistent
with Congress' intent that all taxpayers should be treated uniformly. Finally,
the implications of the court's narrow interpretation will be weighed against the
possible evidentiary burdens that may result from adoption of the broader inter-
pretation. 8
8. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916) (noting that the term "filed" was
never defined by Congress and utilizing the etymology of the word in order to apply its
ordinary meaning in interpreting a federal criminal statute).
9. The presumption was that a properly mailed document would actually be received in due
course by the addressee and this presumption was routinely applied by federal circuit courts
in tax cases. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F. 3d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116
S. Ct. 2547 (1996). The critical element evoking the rule, whose origins began in contract
cases, was the depositing of the envelope in the mailbox. See note 26 infra and accompanying
text. See generally Kenneth H. Ryesky, Mailing Is Filing Only If Proof Of Mailing Is
Incontrovertible, 54 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 153 (1995).
10. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1228.
11. Id. at 1229.
12. See infra Section III C. and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 19-56 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 57-91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 125- 157 and accompanying text.
19. See I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6653, 6661 (1989) and note 50 infra.
20. See facts of Carroll v. Commissioner in text at Part III.A., infra.
[VOL.30: 3
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II. BACKGROUND
Determining when a document is "filed" is important to taxpayers for three
reasons: (1) the late filing of a tax return may subject the taxpayer to failure to
file, negligence, and substantial understatement penalties; 9 (2) the late filing
of a separate election form may result in a possible assessment of deficiency by
the Commissioner; and (3) the delayed filing of a Tax Court petition will result
in the matter being dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.2 '
However, what actually constitutes "filed" has been the subject of much debate.
A. Definition of "Filed" Prior to Enactment of I.R.C. § 7502
Prior to 1954, tax documents were considered "filed" when physically
delivered to and actually received by the Internal Revenue Service. Similarly,
Tax Court petitions were "filed" when actually delivered to the Court.2 3 The
practical result of this "actual-receipt rule" was that taxpayers had to mail their
documents sufficiently in advance of the expiration of the filing period to in-
sure the documents reached the appropriate official before the due date.24
Moreover, the taxpayer ran the risk of delays or mishandling by the post office!
5
To reduce the harshness and inequities created by the "actual-receipt rule",
federal courts routinely applied a common law "mailbox rule": a presumption
that properly mailed documents would actually be received in due course by the
21. I.R.C.§ 6213(a)(1989) provides that the Court acquires jurisdiction only if the taxpayer
files a petition with the Court for redetermination of deficiency within 90 days after the
notice of deficiency (as authorized in § 6212) is mailed. See also Foerster v. Commissioner,
41 T.C.M. (CCH) 775 (1981) (granting Commissioner's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction when taxpayer's petition was never received by the Tax Court and taxpayer failed
to use registered or certified mail).
22. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916) ("Filing is not complete until the
document is delivered and received.") (applying the ordinary meaning of the word); See also
Gates v. State, 28 N. E. 373 (N.Y. 1891) ("shall file" means to deliver to the office, and not
send through the United States mails).
23. Poynor v. Commissioner, 81 F. 2d 521 (C.C.A. 1936) ("A paper is filed when it is
delivered to the Court.").
24. The time interval varied depending on the taxpayer's geographic location. See e.g.
Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 548, 551 (1975) ("Timely filing depended on the vicissitudes
of the mail .... ), nonacq. 1977-2 C.B.
25. The actual receipt rule served to eliminate concerns with evidentiary problems and
who would bear the risk of time and delay in the mails. See Lombardo, 241 U.S. at 78
("Anything less than delivery leaves the filing a disputable fact, and although convenient,
would result in a clash of oral testimonies and confusion"); ("[I]f just depositing mail at the
post office is filing, at what instant in time does this occur and who bears the risk of time or
delay in transportation."). Id. at 79.
26. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932) ("The rule is well settled that proof
that a letter properly directed was placed in a post office creates a presumption that it reached
its destination in usual time and was actually received by the person to whom it was
addressed.") (quoting Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185, 193 (1884)); See also Estate of
Spring 1997]
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addressee. Thus, proof of timely mailing would suffice.26 The regular time was
a normal interval of two or three days and usually not same-day delivery, unless
that in fact was the norm.27 Of course, the presumption is not conclusive and
may be rebutted by specific evidence that the documents were never received
by the proper government office.28
B. Enactment of I.R.C. § 7502
Recognizing the inequities of the "actual receipt rule"'29 and the inconsis-
tent measures taken by courts to address these inequities,3 ° Congress enacted
I.R.C. § 7502, the statutory "mailbox rule."'" One Commentator believes this
Wood v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 793, 798 (1989) (en banc) ("[A]bsent contrary proof of
irregularity, proof of a properly mailed document creates a presumption that the document
was delivered and was actually received by the person to whom it was addressed."), aff'd
909 F. 2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1990).
27. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F. 3d 1228, 1230 (6th Circ. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2547 (1996).
28. Rosenthal, 111 U. S. at 193 ('[T]he presumption so arising is not a conclusive
presumption of law, but a mere inference of fact founded on the probability that the officers
of the government will do their duty in the usual course of business..."). See also Arkansas
Motor Coaches v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 189, 192 (8th Circ. 1952), where a Tax Court
petition was delivered 7 days later than usual, the majority of the court felt that the taxpayer
should not be denied its day in court due to the negligence of government employees - whether
they were Postal or Internal Revenue Service employees. Cf. Lee Brick and Tile Co. v. United
States, 132 F.R.D. 414, 421 (M.D.N.C. 1990) where the taxpayer must not only show strong
evidence of mailing, but also produce evidence that the government failed to receive the
document in question because the government enjoys a "presumption of regularity in
administering its tasks".
29. See Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 548, 551 (1975) nonacq. 1977-2 C.B.
30. See, e.g., Arkansas Motor Coaches v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 189, 192 (8th Cir.
1952).
31. I.R.C. § 7502 ( Law. Co-op. 1995) "Timely mailing treated as timely filing" provides:
(a) General rule.
(1) Date of delivery. If any return, claim, statement, or other document required
to be filed, or any payment required to be made, within a prescribed period or
on or beore a prescribed date under authority of any provision of the internal
revenue laws is, after such period or such date, delivered by the United States
mail to the agency, officer, or office with which such return, claim, statement,
or other document is required to be filed, or to which such payment is required
to be made, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in wh-
ich such return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is mailed sh-
all be deemed to be the date of delivery or the date of payment, as the case may
(2) Mailing requirements. This subsection shall apply only if -
(A) the postmark date falls within the prescribed period or on or before the 36.
See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
prescribed date -
(i) for the filing (including any extension granted for such filing) of the return,
[VOL.30: 3
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rule should be more accurately referred to as the "postmark rule."3 2  In 1996,
§ 7502 was amended to allow the timely mailing provisions to apply to items
delivered by private delivery services.33
The general rule is that a document is considered filed when it is physically
delivered to and actually received by the IRS.34 I.R.C. § 7502 (a)(1)35 provides
a statutory exception to the "actual receipt rule." 6 Under this exception, a
document delivered by the Postal Service after the filing deadline but post-
claim, statement, or other document, or
(ii) for making the payment (including any extension granted for making
such payment), and
(B) the return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment was, within
the time prescribed in subparagraph (A), deposited in the mail in the
United States in an envelope or other appropriate wrapper, postage prepaid,
properly addressed to the agency, officer, or office with which the return,
claim, statement, or other document is required to be filed, or to which
such payment is required to be made.
(b) Postmarks.
This section shall apply in the case of postmarks no made by the
United States Postal Service only if and to the extent provided by
regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
(c) Registered and certified mailing.
(i) Registered mail. For purposes of this section, if any such return, claim,
statement, or other document, or payment, is sent by United States regis-
tered mail -
(A) such registration shall be prima facie evidence that the return, claim,
statement, or other document Was delivered to the agency, officer, or office
to which addressed, and
(B) the date of registration shall be deemed the postmark date.
(2) Certified mail. The Secretary is authorized to provide by regulations the extent to
which the provisions of paragraph (I) of this subsection with respect to prima facie
evidence of delivery and the postmark date shall apply to certified mail.
32. Kenneth Ryesky, Analysis Of The Split Authority, supra note 6, at 383 (emphasizing
that the existence of a postmark is the critical element in determining whether § 7502 applies
as statutory relief from the actual receipt rule); See also Estate of Wood v. Commissioner,
909 F. 2d 1155, 1161 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The act of mailing is not significant for the purposes
of [I.R.C. § 75021 but placement of a postmark is."); In re George, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 494, 496
(N.Y. Sup. 1945) ("An envelope mailed is not an envelope postmarked. The two operations
are separate and distinct.").
33. See discussion infra in Part II.C. of text and accompanying notes.
34. Deutsch v. Commissioner, 599 F. 2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015
(1980); Washton v. United States, 13 F. 3d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. See note 31 supra for text of section.
36. See note 31 supra for text of section.
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marked prior to the deadline, is deemed to have been received on the date of the
postmark.37 Congress further stated in § 7502 (c)(1)(A) that proof that a docu-
ment had been sent by registered mail would constitute prima facie evidence of
delivery to the IRS.3 Unfortunately the statute is silent on how to prove "de-
livery" of a lost document when the taxpayer uses regular mail rather than reg-
istered mail.39 It is precisely the issue of what constitutes delivery under §7502
that has caused the controversy and a split of authority. 40 The Second4 and
Sixth 42 Circuits have adopted the IRS's position that actual delivery of the mail
is a prerequisite for the application of § 7502. 4 3 No extrinsic evidence of post-
mark other than documentary evidence of registered or certified mail is allowed
to prove delivery. 4' The majority of the federal circuits, however, either allow
extrinsic evidence of postmark other than documentary evidence of registered
or certified mail under §7502(a) 45 or apply the common law "mailbox rule"
37. See note 31 supra for text of section.
38. See note 31 supra for text of section.
39. See note 31 supra for text of section.
40. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F. 3d 1228, 1230-1231 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116
S. Ct. 2547 (1996). Whether-the common law presumption of delivery upon proof of mailing
still applies following the enactment of I.R.C. § 7502 is not clear. Id. The IRS takes the
position that absent an actual postmark on the envelope, the taxpayer can prove a timely
mailing only by producing a receipt for registered or certified mail. Ryesky, Analysis Of The
Split Authority, supra note 6, at 393. In addition, most courts have concluded that the common
law presumption no longer applies to tax returns and so taxpayer must comply with provisions
of § 7502 to prove delivery. Id. But see Estate of Wood, 909 F. 2d at 1158 (squarely
rejecting the proposition that § 7502 means that delivery of mail which the IRS cannot locate
can be proven only by producing a receipt for registered or certified mail). Even in circuits
that allow extrinsic evidence other than a receipt for registered or certified mail, however, the
taxpayer is basically still held to the provisions of § 7502: the extrinsic evidence is allowed in
to prove evidence of a postmark to satisfy § 7502(a). Ryesky, Analysis Of The Split Authority,
supra note 6, at 415 n.26.
41. Deutsch v. Commissioner, 599 F. 2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that where petition
to U.S. Tax Court was never received, petition was considered to have never been actually
delivered, and therefore section 7502(a) was not applicable, taxpayer was not allowed to
prove delivery and timeliness by testimony or other evidence offered as proof of actual date
of mailing.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
42. Surowka v. United States, 909 F. 2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that where
return was never received by the IRS, taxpayer's failure to send their return by registered
mail precluded them from relying on circumstantial evidence to prove their return was timely
filed). But see BMC Bankcorp v. United States, 59 F. 3d 170, available at 1995 WL 363387
(6th Cir. 1995) (expressing concern over lack of accountability of the IRS on the mishandling
of tax returns).
43. The IRS, in circuits where the court of appeals do not allow extrinsic evidence of a
postmark, regularly takes the position that section 7502 (c) restricts the taxpayer to producing
only documentary evidence of a registered or certified mailing such as a postal receipt to
establish delivery. See e.g., Washton v. United States, 13 F. 3d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Cope, 680 F. Supp. 912, 917 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
[VOL.30: 3
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allowing presumption of delivery to satisfy the requirement of delivery under
§ 7502(a).46 As a result, the common law "mailbox rule" continues to coincide
with the statute and is not replaced by it.47 I.R.C. § 7502 is completely silent
as to the result of a lost document sent by regular United States mail, creating
a statutory interpretation problem for the courts. 8
Other infrequent approaches taxpayers use to rebut the IRS's hard-line po-
sition include: (1) Equitable estoppel theory: the taxpayer relied on an IRS
official's misrepresentations to the taxpayer's detriment; 49 (2) "Reasonable
cause" under I.R.C. section 6651:50 The taxpayer relied on the representations
of his own attorney or accountant; 1 and (3) unconstitutional denial of due pro-
cess: The taxpayer argues that it is a denial of due process to bar extrinsic evi-
"maildence other than a receipt for registered or certified mail. 2
44. Surowka, 909 F. 2d at 150; Miller v. United States, 784 F. 2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1986).
45. Anderson v. United States, 966 F. 2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that § 7502, allowing
taxpayer to prove timely filing on basis of timely mailing notwithstanding date of physical
delivery of tax return, was not exclusive means of proving timely mailing and filing and did
not bar admission of extrinsic evidence to prove timely delivery).
46. Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 909 F. 2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1990).
47. Id. (holding that under statute providing that if document is postmarked within
prescribed time for filing, but received late, document will be considered to have been timely
filed, presumption of delivery can be used to satisfy requirement of delivery). Cf. Harper v.
Internal Revenue Service, 153 B.R. 84, 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (recognizing common law
presumption of delivery but requiring taxpayer to raise presumption by producing evidence
of a high probative value, and testimony of the taxpayer, alone, was not enough to raise the
presumption).
48. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F. 3d 1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct.
2547 (1996). See also discussion in text at Part IV.A. infra. See generally, Lorraine D.
Chatman, Walden v. Commissioner: What Relief Is Available To Taxpayers Whose Tax Return
Is Lost By The United States Postal Service?, 42 TAX LAW. 735 (1989) (identifying the split
in the circuits concerning timely delivery and recommending that Congress and the courts
should incorporate a reasonableness inquiry when faced with the possible inequities that
may result when a tax return, timely deposited in the United States mail, but not sent by
certified or registered mail, is lost by the Postal Service).
49. Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (denying relief to
taxpayer because equitable estoppel is not usually available against the government on the
same terms as against private parties, at the very least some affirmative misconduct by the
government agent must be shown); United States v. Guy, 978 F. 2d 934 (6th Cir. 1992)
(denying taxpayer relief from assessment of deficiency reasoning that those who deal with
the government are expected to know the law and may not rely on the representation [especially
oral] of government agents contrary to the law).
50. Section 6651 negligence penalty applies to the failure to file tax returns by their due
date unless taxpayer can demonstrate "reasonable cause" for the failure to file. Treas. Reg. §
301.6651 - 1 (c)(1)(1989) specify that a taxpayer may show "reasonable cause" by demonstrating
that he "exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file
the return within the prescribed time ..." The Treasury Regulations also give eight examples
sufficient to constitute "reasonable cause" within the section one of which includes unavoidable
postal delays. Id.
51. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985) (holding that an executor's good-
Spring 19971
7
Stanger: Carroll v. Commissioner
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1997
AKRON LAW REVIEW
C. 1996 Amendment of the 1986 Tax Code - The "Taxpayer Bill of Rights
2 " to Allow for Increased Taxpayer Protections
Congress has amended I.R.C. § 7502 by adding the new subsection (f)
which allows documents delivered by private delivery companies to qualify as
mailed items for purposes of § 7502.1' Prior to this enactment, items that were
delivered by private delivery services did not qualify as a mailed document
within the ambit of § 7502 despite judicial commentary that these services
faith reliance upon an agent to file his estate tax return did not constitute "reasonable cause"
within the meaning of § 6651 because the taxpayer himself was fully capable of meeting the
required standard of ordinary business care and prudence and a taxpayer should only be
relieved of penalty under this section when circumstances were beyond his control).
52. Deutsch v. Commissioner, 599 F. 2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that it was not a
denial of due process to limit eidence allowed because of administrative convenience and
the option of the taxpayer to find effective redress by paying deficiency, filing a claim for a
refund, and if claim is denied commencing an action in Federal District Court to recover the
tax paid), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). See also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S.
589, 595 (1931).
53. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 120, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.)
1474 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 7502(0) (effective July 30, 1996). The House Ways and
Means Committee Report explained that many private delivery companies meet U.S. Postal
Services standards to deliver documents quickly and securely, and that the Secretary of the
Treasury is given authority to expand the "timely-mailing as timely-filing" rule include a
designated delivery service which must be "designated" as such by the Secretary based upon
the criteria specifically listed in I.R.C. § 7502(f)(2) and similar authority with respect to
private delivery services' equivalents to U.S. mail registered and certified mail. H. Rep. No.
104-506 to be reprinted in 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N.
54. I.R.C. § 7502(f) (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Sept. 1996 Supp.). Treatment of private delivery
services.
(1) In general. Any reference in this section to the United states mail shall be treated
as including a reference to any designated delivery service, and any reference in this
section to a postmark by the United States Postal Service shall be treated as including
a reference to any date recorded or marked as described in paragraph (2)(C) by any
designated delivery service.
(2) Designated delivery service. For purposes of this subsection, the term "designated
delivery service" means any delivery service provided by a trade or business if such
service is designated by the Secretary for purposes of this section. The Secretary may
designate a delivery service under the preceding sentence only if the Secretary
determines that such service -
(A) is available to the general public,
(B) is at least as timely and reliable on a regular basis as the United States mail,
(C) records electronically to its data base, kept in the regular course of its
business, or marks on the cover in which any item referred to in this section is to
be delivered, the date on which such item was given to such trade or business for
delivery, and
(D) meets such other criteria as the Secretary may prescribe.
(3) Equivalents of registered and certified mail. The Secretary may provide a rule
(Vol. 30:3
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were on par with those of the U.S. Postal Service."
However, Congress did not amend § 7502 to clarify any of the ambiguities
and differences in interpretation of the statute relating to the common law pre-
sumption of delivery or to the kind of evidence allowed to prove "delivery" of
a tax document.
5 6
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
James R. Carroll purchased all the stock of Volunteer Corporation in
November 1986. On January 21, 1987, Carroll, as an officer and consenting
stockholder of Volunteer, signed IRS election form 2553 to elect S-corporation 57
status for Volunteer.58 Carroll mailed the election form by U.S. Postal Service
regular mail in a properly addressed envelope bearing adequate postage that
same day. 9
similar to the rule of paragraph (1) with respect to any service provided by a designated delivery
service which is substantially equivalent to United States registered or certified mail.
55. Petrulis v. Commissioner, 938 F. 2d 78 (7th Cir. 1991); Blank v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 400 (1981). Pugsley v. Commissioner, 749 F. 2d 691, 693 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
56. See note 54 supra. The omission of any clarifying language on point may be used by
courts in the future interpretation of § 7502. Those courts supporting the IRS' position may
apply an analysis analogous to the canon of construction expressio unius, exclusio alterius: §
7502 (c) expressly mentions that proof of mailing by registered and certified mail is allowed.
If the legislature had wanted to clarify the matter it would have done so with this latest
amendment. See generally Michael Livingston, What's Blue And White And Not Quite As
Good As A Committee Report: General Explanations And The Role Of "Subsequent" Tax
Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 91 (1994) ( recommending that courts should apply
a practical approach when evaluating subsequent tax legislative history focusing on the
individual circumstances and facts of each case).
57. Id. Each shareholder of an S corporation records his own pro rata share of corporate
items of income, deduction, loss, and credit on his own form 1040 in his tax year in which the
corporation's tax year ends (commonly referred to as pass-through income and loss items).
I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1989). Thus, the S corporation and its shareholders avoid the double taxation
experienced by a C corporation when tax is paid on profits at the corporate level, and also on
dividends paid to the shareholder at the shareholder's level.
58. Form 2553 "Election by a Small Business Corporation" must be filed by a qualified
corporation, with the unanimous consent of all shareholders, on or before the 15th day of the
3rd month of its tax year in order for the election to be effective beginning with the year when
made (in this case due date would be no later than March 16, 1987). I.R.C. § 1362(a), (b)
(1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-2(b), (c)(1989). The election form was prepared by taxpayer's
accounting firm. Carroll v. Commissioner, 1994 WL 223053, at *1, aff'd 71 F.3d 1228 (6th
Cir. 1995), Cert. denied 116 S.Ct. 2547 (1996).
59. Carroll v. Commissioner, 1994 WL 223053, at *1. Carroll made a note to his secretary
that the form had to be mailed that same day and his secretary prepared an envelope addressed
to the IRS service center in Memphis and affixed the necessary postage. The secretary then
gave the envelope to another employee who made a special trip to mail it by dropping it in a
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Carol and his wife filed joint returns for the tax year, and included a loss
of approximately $58,000 from the corporation on their return.6° The claimed
loss from 1987 was carried over to their 1988 joint return.61
The IRS disallowed the 1988 loss claimed from Volunteer on the grounds
that there had been no S-election form filed for Volunteer for 1987.62 The dis-
allowance of the loss resulted in a finding of tax deficiency for 1988.63
Although there is no evidence that the IRS Memphis Service Center ever
received Volunteer's election form, the IRS did provide Volunteer with a pre-
printed address label, which included a new employer identification number
(EIN) for the use on Volunteer's 1987 tax return.6 4 The issuance of the new EIN
raised a question about the receipt of the election form.
65
B. Procedural History
Carroll and his spouse filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redeter-
mination of the deficiency. 66 The Tax Court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and found as a fact, that the S-corporation election form had been mailed to the
IRS on January 21, 1987.67 The IRS does not dispute the accuracy of this fac-
tual finding. 6 However, the IRS contended that because the original form could
postal box at the Knoxville post office. Id.
60. Id. at *3.
61. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F. 3d 1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct.
2547 (1996).
62. Id.
63. Id. Because the Tax Court refused to apply § 7502 "mailbox rule" or the common law
presumption of delivery, the Carrolls suffered a deficiency of $22,479.25. Id.
64. Id. at 1230-1233.
65. Id. at 1233. Carroll argued that the EIN was compelling evidence that the Form 2553
was received by the IRS and relied on an unpublished opinion of the Court, Trimarco v.
United States, No. 91-3453, 1992 WL 28082 (6th Cir. 1992), wherein the taxpayer mailed
both an S corporation election form and an EIN request form to the IRS. Although the IRS
claimed never to have received the election form, it issued the EIN and the Sixth Circuit
Court inferred that the taxpayer's election form did not miscarry in the mails. Id. Unfortunately
for Carroll, the Court found that his case was not like that of Trimarco because Carroll did
not mail the EIN request form with the election form, and issuance of the number did not
prove receipt of the election form. Id.
66. Carroll v. Commissioner, 1994 WL 223053, at *1 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1994). Taxpayers were
still residents of Knoxville when they filed their petition. Id.
67. Id. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had provided considerable evidence that the
form was mailed basically because of the meticulous records kept by the taxpayer's personal
secretary: the testimony rose above mere habit evidence. Id at *4. See also note 59 supra.
68. Carroll, 1994 WL 223053, at *4.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *6.
71. Id.
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not be located, there was no proof that the document had been postmarked on
before the deadline and thus actually delivered to the IRS. 69
Carroll argued that the preprinted label attached to Volunteer's 1987 form
11 20s proved that the original form was actually delivered to the IRS."' The Tax
Court rejected this argument, noting that the taxpayer had never shown that the
original election form was the only (or even the most likely reason) why the IRS
would have sent the preprinted label attached to Volunteer's 1987 Form 1 120s.71
The Tax Court also held that the form was not timely filed because Carroll had
insufficient evidence to prove timely filing under § 7502 as interpreted by the
Sixth Circuit.72 Although the Carrolls could prove they mailed the envelope,
their evidence was insufficient to prove evidence of a postmark, and thus they
could not invoke § 7502. 71
The Carrolls appealed the Tax Court's decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.74 The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the decision
of the Tax Court holding that the common law "mailbox rule" did not apply to
the taxpayer because § 7502 repealed the presumption of delivery, unless the
taxpayer used registered or certified mail. 71
C. Reasoning of The Appeals Court
The issue before the court was whether the common law "mailbox rule"
applies to a document sent to the IRS by regular first-class mail. 76
The court discussed the pre- 1954 "actual receipt rule" and the common law
"mailbox rule" and how the enactment of section 7502 altered those rules
72. As stated in Salmi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th
Cir. 1985):"a panel of that court cannot overrule the decision of another panel and the prior
decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court requires modification of the decision or the sixth circuit court sitting en banc overrules
the prior decision."
73. Carroll, 1994 WL 223053, at *5. See Miller v. United States, 784 F. 2d 728, 730 (6th
Cir. 1986) (rejecting applicability of common law "mailbox rule" with presumption of
delivery); Surowka v. United States, 784 F. 2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 7502
creates the only exceptions to physical delivery rule). Contra Estate of Wood v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 793, 798 (1989) (holding that the common law presumption, that proof of a properly
mailed document is received applies in § 7502 cases and that § 7502(c) creates a "safe
harbor" for taxpayers who file by registered or certified mail but that a taxpayer, to obtain the
benefit of § 7502 must offer more than just evidence of mailing).
74. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct.
2547 (1996).
75. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1233.
76. Id. at 1229.
77. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1230. See also notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text.
78. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1231.
79. See note 40 supra.
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by allowing a document postmarked before or on the filing date but delivered
after that date to relate back to postmark date.77
The court noted that the statute is silent on whether a taxpayer who uses
regular mail and whose document is lost can get relief under § 7502 because that
taxpayer cannot offer any direct proof that the document had been postmarked
on or before the due date or that the document was actually delivered to the
IRS. 8
In an attempt to answer the question of whether § 7502 repealed the com-
mon law "mailbox rule" in all cases other than those where registered or certi-
fied mail was used,79 the court examined the reasoning of the leading cases
upholding the retention of the common law "mailbox rule."8 In doing so, the
Eighth Circuit's Estate of Wood v. Commissioner8 and the Ninth Circuit's
Anderson v. United States, 2 both interpret § 7502 broadly. The court then com-
pared"3 these cases with the leading Sixth Circuit cases on point, Miller v. United
States84 and Surowka v. United States.
85
80. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1230.
81. 92 T.C. 793, 797-799 (1989) (en banc), aff'd 909 F. 2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1990). On
similar facts, the Wood court rejected the IRS's argument that registered or certified mail was
the exclusive means of proving delivery and concluded that using registered or certified mail
was only a "safe harbor" because Congress would have known of this common law presumption
yet it did not express its intent to exclude other methods either in the Code nor in the statute's
legislative history. Thus, "delivery" could be also be shown by applying the common law
presumption of delivery. The Eighth Circuit agreed and pointed out that the common law
presumption of delivery existed before § 7502 and the statute did not replace it. See also
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't. of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986) (stating that "[tihe normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes the intent
specific").
82. 966 F. 2d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing both Miller and Surowka as unpersuasive
and upholding the "mailbox rule" based upon a plain reading of the statute: there was no clear
displacement of the common law presumption reflected in the statute itself).
83. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1230.
84. 784 F. 2d 728 (1986). On similar facts, the Miller court did not agree that the use of
registered or certified mail was only a "safe harbor" and reasoned that public policy demanded
an objective "bright line" standard and that the only exceptions to the physical delivery rule
were: (1) where the IRS receives the document with an applied postmark prior to the deadline
date; or (2) the use of registered or certified mail and the date of registration or certification
is also not later than the deadline date. In effect, for purposes of the § 7502 exceptions, filing
is complete at the time a mailing is postmarked, regardless of the time of actual delivery. Id.
at 1232. See also Deutsch v. Commissioner at 46 (construing § 7502 as requiring "an easily
applied, objective standard").
85. 909 F. 2d 148 (6th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Miller as limiting "circumstantial proof' of
timely filing where neither of the aforementioned exceptions to § 7502 applied because the
exceptions make filing complete on the postmark date. The date of delivery, whether actual
or provided by the common law presumption, is irrelevant and therefore evidence concerning
the delivery date would be inadmissible). Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1232.
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Although acknowledging that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits agree on the
issue, the court concluded that the Sixth Circuit would continue to follow its
own precedents.8 6 To underscore this point, the court emphasized that it had re-
cently been asked to reconsider Miller and Surowka in an en banc hearing but
had declined to do so.17 The court also briefly addressed and then dismissed
Carroll's argument that regardless of the abandonment of the "mailbox rule," the
preprinted label provided "compelling evidence" that his form was received by
the IRS.88 Finally, the court affirmed the Tax Court's assessment of deficiency
but the court's tone was decidedly apologetic when it noted that the taxpayers
involved in the case were victims of their own geography. 89
Undeterred by the court's decision, Carroll petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.' However, the Court denied the writ.9
86. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1232. See supra note 72.
87. Id at 1232. In BMC Bankcorp v. United States, No. 94-5842, 1995 WL 363387 (6th
Cir. 1995), the Court considered the issue of whether a taxpayer who did not come within the
terms of § 7502 could avail himself of the common law presumption of delivery where
documents were properly mailed to the IRS and a three- judge panel upheld precedent that
clearly required an abandonment of the common law presumption. The taxpayer petitioned
for a rehearing en banc, but the number of judges voting in favor of a rehearing, including the
author of the Carroll opinion Judge Nelson, were in the minority. Id. See also the rules
concerning Sixth Circuit precedent, supra at note 72.
88. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1233. The taxpayers relied on the Court's unpublished opinion in
Trimarco v. United States, 1992 WL 28082 (6th Cir. 1992) where the taxpayer mailed the
IRS both an S-corporation form and an application for an employer identification number.
The Carroll court distinguished that case from the case at bar because in this case the election
form was not accompanied by a EIN request and therefor issuance of the number did not
prove receipt of the election form. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1233.
89. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1233. (emphasizing that if the taxpayers resided outside of the
jurisdiction of the Second and Sixth Circuit courts the presumption of delivery would have
provided a different result).
90. See generally Supreme Court Rule 10(1) in STERN, GRESSMAN & SHAPIRO, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 890 (6th ed., 1986).
91. Carroll v. Commissioner, 116 S. Ct. 2547 (1996). See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (declaring that a denial of a petition for certiorari is not a decision
on the merits). See also Ryesky, Analysis Of The Split Authority, supra note 6, at 396
(commenting that federal taxation is considered to be such a complex and technical area of
the law that even the most erudite judges admit difficulty in interpreting taxation statutes);
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974) (Douglas J., dissenting) (observing that
the U.S. Supreme Court is not well-equipped in resolving tax disputes due to the technical
nature of taxation, the expansion of the I.R.C., the "proliferation of decisions," and the Court's
inability to develop expertise in the area due to their relative inexperience).
92. See generally James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules And The Decline Of The Courts In
The Law Of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 265 (1995) (arguing that the tax law has
evolved from being governed by broad standards to being dominated by specific rules, and
that as a result of this evolution, power has shifted away from the courts and to the U.S.
Congress).
93. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1228-1233.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Interpretation
In upholding the Sixth Circuit's narrow interpretation of § 7502, the
Carroll court was confronted with the application of an ambiguously-worded
statute.92 Although the court discussed the broad interpretation of the Wood and
Anderson cases and compared these cases to the court's own binding precedents,
Miller and Surowka,93 they did not explicitly delve into the underlying purpose
of section 7502. 94 Further, the court never compared the result in the Carroll
case, a denial of the invocation of the common law mailbox rule, with this
underlying purpose. 95 Instead the court combined a cursory plain reading of
§ 7502(a) and 7502(c) with the interpretations of those sections in the cases pre-
viously mentioned to support their conclusion that Congress did not intend to
revoke the common law presumption of delivery. 96 The court did not mention
the legislative history of section 7502.11
In Wood, the Tax Court allowed extrinsic evidence of a mailing where the
IRS never received the taxpayer's federal estate tax return .98 The court exam-
ined the plain meaning of § 7502(c) which declares that if any such document
is sent U.S. registered mail, 99 such registration will be primafacie evidence that
the document was deliyered to the appropriate agency. 0 Indeed,the
94.1d at 1233. Although it could be argued that implicit in their discussion of the
development of the law was that § 7502 was enacted to provide relief from the actual receipt
rule. Id.
95. Id. See also Michael A. Livingston, Congress, The Courts, And The Code: Legislative
History And The Interpretation Of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 871 (1991) (maintaining
that the canons of statutory construction can be used to support any conclusion and that
courts may sometimes simply reason backward from conclusions to select whichever principle
supports their chosen result).
96. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1230-1231. See supra note 31 (providing text of §§ 7502(a) and
(c)). See also Ryesky, Analysis Of The Split Authority, supra note 6, at 396 (arguing that
courts who accept the IRS "exclusive means of proof " interpretation of § 7502 do so with
"robotic predictability" and will ignore any interpretation inconsistent with that position.)
97. Carroll, 71 F. 3d at 1230-1233.
98. Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 793, 793, aff'd. 909 F. 2d 1155.
99. I.R.C. § 7502(c)(1).
100. I.R.C. § 7502(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
101. See e.g., the discussion regarding statutory construction in Estate of Wood v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 793, 797 (1989) (en banc), wherein the Court concludes that section
7502(c) appears to be a "safe harbor" within § 7502, not an exclusive means proof as the IRS
suggests. But see e.g., the dissent's opinion in the same case at p. 802 interpreting the
delivery provision in § 7502(a)(1) to mean actual and not presumed delivery; Walden v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 947, 948 (1988) (arguing that if by applying the common law
presumption that mailing constitutes delivery, the need for § 7502(c) would be obviated).
102. Wood, 92 T.C. at 799. The court refused to repeal the common law presumption of
delivery unless there were specific Congressional statements rejecting the well-known prin-
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language regarding registered and certified mailing is highly discretionary: if
the use of registered or certified mail is the taxpayer's only salvation as the IRS
suggests, why is this not listed under § 7502(a)(2) "mailing requirements" rather
than in a separate subsection?' The court also examined the legislative history
of the section and concluded that neither the plain meaning of § 7502 nor its leg-
islative history indicates that Congress intended to repeal the common law pre-
sumption of delivery. 0 2 The court further concluded that the rules of § 7502 are
compatible with presumption of delivery because the presumption only works
as an evidentiary tool in determining that a document is delivered, while the
statute changes the filing date from date of delivery to the date of mailing." 3
In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit also allowed extrinsic evidence of mailing
where the IRS never received a taxpayer's individual federal tax return.0 4 The
court specifically noted that the purpose of § 7502 was to alleviate the harsh-
ness of the old actual-receipt rule, which left taxpayers at the mercy of the U.S.
Postal Service. 0 5  The Court's plain reading of the section revealed that §
7502(c) only applied if a document was sent by registered or certified mail 0 6 and
the court agreed with Wood that the enactment of § 7502 did not repeal the com-
mon law presumption of delivery. 0 7
In Miller, the Sixth Circuit held that the only exceptions to the physical
delivery rule are those found in § 7502,108 and therefore a taxpayer who did not
use registered or certified mail and whose refund claim was never received by
the IRS could not claim any other relief.0 9 Like the court in Anderson," ° the
ciple. Id. at 800.
103. Id. The court believed the question of delivery is distinct from the question of whether
a timely mailing is a timely filing and a timely postmark is what must be proven to invoke §
7502 relief. Id.
104. Anderson v. United States, 966 F. 2d 487, 488 (9th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 490.
106. Id. at 491. The court justified this conclusion with the same reasoning used by the
Eighth Circuit in Wood: absent a clear mandate from Congress, pre-existing judicial
constructions will be maintained. Id.
107. Miller v. United States, 784 F. 2d 728, 728 (6th Cir. 1986).
108. Miller, 784 F. 2d at 728.
109. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
110. Miller, 784 F. 2d at 730.
111. Id. at 731. The court effectively reconstrues the purpose of § 7502. Id. Instead of
providing relief to taxpayers for inconsistent postal service deliveries, the purpose is to provide
a bright-line standard for courts and taxpayers to follow. Id. If section 7502 is not literally
applicable, the court will deny extrinsic evidence as proof of mailing. Id. at 732. Cf. Shipley
v. Commissioner, 572 F. 2d 212 (9th Cir. 1977) (construing the purpose of § 7502 and
applicable regulations as favoring tangible evidence of the date of mailing over oral testimony).
See also discussion of policy concerns at Part IV.B., infra.
112. See notes 107-111 supra and accompanying text.
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Sixth Circuit stated the purpose of enactment of § 7502 was to alleviate
inequities in mail delivery."' Unlike Anderson, however, the Sixth Circuit
refused to apply the common law presumption of delivery because the excep-
tions in § 7502 are "exclusive and complete."" 2
In Surowka, the Sixth Circuit relied on Miller"3 to hold that § 7502 pro-
vides the only exceptions to the actual-receipt rule and that a taxpayer who does
not send his return by registered or certified mail is precluded from relying on
extrinsic evidence to prove timely filing of his return." 4 The Sixth Circuit dis-
tinguished Wood, noting that the Sixth Circuit does not apply the common law
presumption of delivery." 5
An independent examination of Treasury Department Regulations reveals
that they are worded similarly to the statute and are therefore just as ambiguous
as to who bears the risk of non-delivery." 6 The IRS publications to taxpayers
and the actual instructions to tax form 1040"11 are equally ambiguous.
Moreover, an independent examination of the legislative history" 8 of
113. Surowka v. United States, 909 F. 2d 148, 148 (6th Cir. 1990).
114. Id. at 150. See also Bruder v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. 873, 874 (1989) (holding
that presumption of delivery does not apply to cases appealable to the Sixth Circuit because
the circuit had previously rejected the applicability of any such presumption).
115. See e.g., Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 793, 797 (1989) (en banc)
(interpreting Treas. Reg. § 301.7502- 1(c)(2), Procedural & Administrative Regulations, as
explaining the taxpayer's risk in sending a document by first class mail instead of registered
or certified mail is that the document will not be postmarked on the day it is deposited in the
mail). But see e.g., Walden v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 947, 952 (1988) (interpreting the same
regulation to mean the taxpayer must assume the risk of non-delivery of their document to the
IRS).
116. See generally IRS, Publication 17, Your Federal Income Tax (1995) (published
annually) which is relied upon by taxpayers and tax practitioners to provide guidance in
properly preparing their individual returns. The ambiguity in this particular publication
received judicial interpretation in Alexander v. United States, 93-1 T.C. (CCH) 50,288
(1993), wherein the court found that the parlance in that publication was inconsistent with the
IRS's position that registered and certified mail are the exclusive means of proof under I.R.C.
§ 7502 and the court chastised the IRS to make the language more explicit.
117. See When Should ! File?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1995 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 9
(1995). The instructions do not even include a separate heading relating to mailing the return:
they just warn that filing is "no later than APRIL 15, 1996."
118. See S. Rep. No. 1625, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3676,
3683-84; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5266; H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017,
4583. See also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons Of Statutory
Construction And Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. LAW REV. 647, 651 (1992) (stating that the
use of interpretive methods such as the canons of construction, stare decisis, and legislative
history are a result of public policy concerns, and not in any inherent authority of the techniques
themselves).
119. See Sylvan v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 548, 552 (1975), wherein the court allowed
evidence of mailing to support a timely filing of petition to Tax Court. The majority declared
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I.R.C. §7502 creates similar confusion by enabling each side of the sp-
lit in authority to cull support for their position."19 One Commentator on the
subject of legislative intent as it applies to the timely-filing rules contends that
a reading of committee reports on a subsequent amendment to the code section
reveals that the legislature intended that evidence be allowed to prove the ex-
istence of a filing and that those courts who construe § 7502(c) as preempting
the common law "mailbox rule" are conducting a legal, rather than a factual, in-
quiry. 1
20
Thus, an investigation of the statutory language of § 7502, that section's
relevant legislative history, and case law interpreting that section, reveals that
those circuits adopting a broad interpretation of the statute attempt to go beyond
a literal construction .'1' These courts define the statute's purpose and interpret
the statute, in light of pre-existing judicial presumptions, to achieve the statute's
purpose. 22 The Second and Sixth circuits, however, attempt a literal applica-
tion of the plain meaning of the statute. 23 Because the language of the code
section, regulations, and its legislative history are so ambiguous, and tax legis-
lation itself is such a political topic, 24 are there other reasons the court should
consider when interpreting § 7502?
that the legislative history supporting the section revealed that Congress had only considered
the case where a postmark was affixed (however illegibly) but had not considered the case
where no postmark was affixed, and the Court believed that had Congress considered that
circumstance, it would have allowed evidence in to support existence of a postmark. The
dissent in the same case, however, felt that the same passages supported their contention that
Congress' intent was that a postmark date is required to make section 7502 applicable in the
first place. See H. Rept. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 615 (1954); S. Rept. No. 1622, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 615 (1954).
120. Lorraine D. Chatman, Walden v. Commissioner: What Relief Is Available To Taxpayers
Whose Tax Return Is Lost By The United States Postal Service?, 42 TAx LAW. 735, 741
(Spring 1989) (interpreting H.R. 6958, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) and S. Rep. No. 1625,
891h Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1966) to mean that reviewing courts may engage in a factual inquiry
of timely mailing using a facts-and-circumstances test).
121. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text, supra.
122. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text, supra.
123. See notes 107-114 and accompanying text, supra.
124. James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules, And The Decline Of The Courts In The Law Of
Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REv. 265, 270 (1995) (stating that "tax legislation occurs in a super-
charged political atmosphere.").
125. Surowka v. United States, 909 F. 2d 148, 150 (6th Cir. 1990); Miller v. United States,
784 F. 2d 728 (6th Cir. 1986); Deutsch v. Commissioner, 599 F. 2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979)
(noting that Courts construing I.R.C. S7502 narrowly are looking for an "easily applied,
objective standard"). See also note 11I supra.
126. In Re Lilley, 152 B.R. 715, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (describing the IRS as acting
in primarily in its own interests while waiting for the court to subsequently determine the
propriety of their actions).
127. United States v. Cope, 680 F. Supp. 912, 918 (W.D. KY 1987) (expressing concern
for the Sixth Circuit interpretation of I.R.C. S7502 as holding the IRS accountable for any
mishandling of tax returns).
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B. Policy Reasons, Bureaucratic Behavior, and Credibility Problems
Underlying the issue in the Carroll case is a balancing of interests: the
court's interest in applying a bright-line rule that bolsters judicial economy; 2 '
the IRS' interest in upholding an uncompromising position that maximizes tax
assessments;' 26 and the taxpayer's interest in minimizing tax burdens and in
holding the IRS as accountable as a private citizen would be.' 27 While the ad-
ditional cost of registered or certified mail may not be a great burden on most
taxpayers, the burden of enhanced filing requirements does not foster the
American system of voluntary taxpayer compliance. 2 8
However, a broad interpretation of § 7502129 upholding the common law
presumption of delivery and allowing proof other than registered or certified
mail raises credibility problems for the court and administrative problems for
the IRS. These concerns were raised in the seminal case, United States v.
Lombardo, that warned of evidentiary difficulties and burdens on the Court.
30
Indeed, many of the courts who upheld the narrow interpretation of §7502 may
have done so because the other evidence presented lacked credibility.' 3' Tax-
payer claims may be biased. However, this problem could be avoided by requir-
ing corroborating evidence to enhance the credibility of the taxpayer's testi-
mony.132
128. See DONALD C. ALEXANDER, COMMISSIONER IRS, DIRECTIVE: IRS ORGANIZATION
AND FUNCTIONS SI 11.1 (Mar. 25, 1974) (stating that voluntary tax compliance is a "key
element of the IRS mission").
129. Hess v. Commissioner, No. 22332-85, 22334-85, 1989 WL 88928 *8 (U.S. Tax Ct.
1989) (asserting that the purpose of I.R.C. S7502(c) is to favor documentary evidence of
mailing date over oral testimony).
130. 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916) (asserting that to allow such evidence would result in confusion
and "the clash of oral testimonies"); See also note 25 supra.
131. Maxant v. Commissioner, 40.T.C.M. (CCH) 1328 (1980) (where entry in attorney's
diary appeared unreasonable given his nonrecollection of the actual filing); Kahle v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1063 (1987) (document appeared to be back-dated).
132. See e.g., Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 909 F. 2d 1155, 1161 (8th Cir. 1990)
(credible corroboration includes the testimony of the postal employee who applied the
postmark); Anderson v. United States, 966 F. 2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992) (testimony of a
disinterested witness who saw taxpayer enter post office with envelope and exit without it
successfully corroborated taxpayer's testimony).
133. See generally George Guttman, Electronic Filing: Who Pays, Who Benefits, 66 TAX
NOTES 1750 (1995); IRS Form 8453, U.S. Individual Income Tax Declaration For Electronic
Filing (filed by tax preparers to transmit taxpayer's and return preparer's signatures for the
return).
134. See generally James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules And The Decline Of The Courts In
The Law Of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 265 (1995) (describing the process by which tax
law has evolved: enactment, confusion, litigation, and further enactment to clarify the original
statute).
135. See discussion at Part IV.B. in text supra. and accompanying notes.
136. See discussion of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 in text at Part II.C. supra and accom-
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C. Other Items to Consider That May Resolve Issue or Render It Moot
Although the increased use of electronic filing of IRS documents may
render the interpretation of § 7502 a moot issue, electronic filing is not with-
out its problems and is unlikely to be utilized by small companies or low-income
taxpayers due to the cost of computers and related software.' 33
Congress itself may decide to amend the statute to clarify the matter or the
Supreme Court may decide to grant a writ of certiorari for another case based
upon similar facts.' 34 Further, credibility problems in courts that now allow
extrinsic evidence of a postmark other than a receipt for registered or certified
mail may cause changes of opinion in those courts.' 35
Unfortunately, the recent amendment to I.R.C. § 7502 did not address the
issue of the admission of extrinsic evidence other than a postmark or on the
repeal of the common law "mailbox rule."' 36 Unless the Congress or the U.S.
Supreme Court decides to squarely address this issue the split in authority will
continue, leaving the taxpayer at the mercy of his geographic location.
V. RESOLUTIONS
Although the Carroll court felt bound by Sixth Circuit precedent to uphold
the IRS' "irrebutable the ptesumption of nondelivery '"1 7 interpretation of I.R.C.
§7502, it also recognized the inequity of the result. 3 8 The Supreme Court may
finally agree to consider issue,'3 9 or Congress may rewrite § 7502 to clarify the
panying notes.
137. Lorraine D. Chatman, Walden v. Commissioner: What Relief Is Available To Taxpayers
Whose Tax Return Is Lost By The United States Postal Service?, 42 TAx LAW. 735, 744
(1989).
138. Carroll v. Commissioner, 71 F. 3d, 1233 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court stated "[if the
Carrolls] had been residents of any state other than Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan,
Connecticut, New York, or Vermont, the Tax Court would have allowed them to invoke the
presumption of delivery and would have decided this case in their favor. Because the Carrolls
live in Tennessee, however, the presumption of delivery does not work for them. Having
failed to use registered or certified mail when they sent the Form 2553 to the IRS, the Carrolls
must pay an additional $22,000 in taxes." Id
139. The legal tool of statutory interpretation has garnered much attention since the
appointment of Justice Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court. Deborah A. Geier, Commentary:
Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 445, 447 (1993) (examining Scalia's brand of
"new textualism" and hypothesizing that he may not summarily defer to the IRS' interpretation
of a statute because his style of interpretation relies on the common meaning of words and
does not include selecting a result first and then justifying it with text outside of the statute).
Ms. Geier believes that a uniform approach to statutory interpretation is imprudent because
there are times when a textualist, originalist or dynamic approach may be warranted to reach
an equitable result. Id. at 488. But see Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory
Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV., 585, 588 (1996) (arguing that legal scholars have neglected
the field of statutory interpretation and that recent Supreme Court decisions reveal a lack of a
uniform theory of interpretation).
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matter. 40 One Commentator believes the most expeditious solution would be
for the IRS and the Tax Court to issue regulations 4' that would fairly balance
the court's evidentiary burdens against the unfair burdens of the taxpayers. 42
A. Recommendations for an Equitable Evidentiary Standard
In order to develop an evidentiary standard that would equalize these
burdens, I.R.C. § 7502(c)(1)(A) should be examined in conjunction with the
common-law rules to resolve the ambiguity.'43 These common-law readings
range from the "restrictive to the expansive.""' The Wood court's restrictive
interpretation of that section required near-definitive proof of a postmark in
order to invoke the common-law presumption of delivery. 4 An expansive in-
terpretation of that section would interpolate the common-law presumption of
delivery automatically upon presentation of a registered mail receipt, leaving the
courts to develop an evidentiary standard concerning the credibility of other
extrinsic evidence. 146
So what kind of extrinsic evidence is credible enough? It has already
been stated that more than the taxpayer's naked assertion that his
document was mailed should be required. 47 The facts and circumstances
of each case must be examined. Sufficient corroborating evidence
could include: testimony from a third-party confirming the mailing,' 41
140. Congress could amend I.R.C. § 7502 to add a new subsection specifically addressingthe
taxpayer's evidentiary burdens. See, e.g. I.R.C. § 534 (1994) which addresses the burden of
proof on a corporation that allegedly has accumulated an improper surplus.
141. The IRS's power to issue interpretive regulations stems from I.R.C. § 7805(a)(1994)
where Congress directs the Treasury Department to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by
reason of any alteration of law in relation to the internal revenue." The Tax Court's authority
to promulgate rules of practice and procedure stems from I.R.C. § 7453 (1994).
142. Ryesky, supra note 6 at 407-408 (encouraging the IRS and the Tax Court to take the
"initiative to issue regulations" to address the issue in order to circumvent the need for Supreme
Court review).
143. Thomas J. Bamonte, Is Registered Mail The Only Way To Prove That A Document
Was Mailed To IRS?, 75 J. TAX'N 150, 154 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Wood, 92 T.C. 793, 797.
146. Bamonte, supra note 143 at 155.
147. Lee Brick & Tile Co. v. U.S., 132 F.R.D. 414 (M.D.N.C. 1990); In Re Grable, 188
B.R. 595 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
148. Wood, 92 T.C. 793 (postal employee who applied the postmark); Anderson, 966 F. 2d
at 487 (disinterested witness who saw taxpayer enter and leave post office).
149. Lee Brick and Tile, at 414.
150. Bamonte, supra note 143 at 156. Ironically the IRS has been allowed to prove a
certified mailing with extrinsic evidence of its own mailing procedures, a standard they would
not allow a taxpayer to follow even if they had credible evidence of a regular pattern of
business conduct. Ryesky, supra note 6, at 403.
151. LeFebre V. Commissioner, 830 F. 2d 417,419 (1st Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Commissioner,
771 F. 2d 478, 479-80 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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receipt by other authorities of other documents that rely on IRS requirements, 49
or intimations that the IRS did not follow its own recordkeeping procedures.1 0
Other refinements may include differentiating between taxpayer status or
type of document being filed. For example, the most unjust results appear to
occur when a taxpayer is assessed penalties because his tax return was lost in the
mail. Where the taxpayer is appealing an IRS deficiency finding in Tax Court,
however, demanding stringent evidence of a postmark may be considered just
one of many procedural requirements. '5' Also, the level of sophistication of the
taxpayer," or of the return'53 could be taken into account.
B. Existing Tools Within the I.R.C.
As mentioned previously, taxpayers in circumstances like those of Carroll
have unsuccessfully attempted to abate penalties and interest for failure to
timely file tax returns by invoking I.R.C. § 665 1(a)(2) "reasonable cause" re-
lief. 154 Perhaps the IRS could broaden the circumstances evoking relief under
this section to include the case where a taxpayer could produce credible evi-
dence that his tax document was postmarked, but through no fault of his own,
it was never received by the IRS. 5 Moreover, I.R.C. § 6404 allows the IRS to
abate penalties for their own errors and delays. 156 This section could amel-
152. Schwartz v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 63 (1994) (attorneys); United States v.
Fritzson, 979 f. 2d 21 (2d Cir. 1992) (accountants); Crismali v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1579 (1995) (IRS agent).
153. Ryesky, supra note 6, at 413 (contending that estate and gift tax returns and corporate
returns require a higher "degree of tax sophistication" than individual returns and that limiting
proof to registered or certified mail for these "specialized" returns may be a feasible alternative
to the present IRS position).
154. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (1994), as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No.
104-168 (effective July 30, 1996) (stating that penalties and interest for failing to file a return
may be abated if "such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect); See
also William Kenny and Larry Jaffe, CPAs, Reasonable Cause Can Be a Penalty Defense -
But What Is It?, 20 TAX'N FOR LAW. 350, 350 (1992) (relating that several I.R.C. sections
contain a reasonable cause defense but the IRS has not adopted a uniform definition for the
defense leading to confusion for taxpayers and practitioners). For example, I.R.C. § 6662
(1994), imposes an accuracy-related penalty on a taxpayer unless he shows reasonable cause
for the infraction and that the infraction was made in good faith. Id.
155. Chatman, supra note 48, at 745-746 (arguing that a taxpayer who uses the correct
postage and address on the document should be able to rely on the U.S. Postal Service delivery
and therefore be able to utilize the reasonable cause exception).
156. I.R.C. § 6404, as amended by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168
(effective July 30, 1996) and adding subsection (f), for tax years beginning after July 30,
1996 even allows for abatement of any penalty "attributable to erroneous written advice" by
the IRS given by an employee acting in an official capacity in response to a written request
from the taxpayer.
157. Victoria A. Levin, Comment, The Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Tax Law: Equity
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iorate the harsh results for taxpayers whose returns are not timely filed due to
mishandling by the IRS. Finally, the doctrine of substantial compliance [similar
to substantial performance in contract law] has been developed in tax law to
avoid the pitfalls associated with making tax elections.
5 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the enactment of an ambiguously-worded statute, the federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals are divided on the issue of what evidence may be shown
to prove timely filing of tax documents. Carroll is just one of the latest cases
supporting the minority's narrow interpretation of I.R.C. § 7502. Even though
the Sixth Circuit felt bound by clear precedent to uphold its position, the court's
decision exhibited overt remorse for the plight of taxpayers who used regular,
U.S. mail and whose document was lost due to no fault of their own.
Although the language of §7502 is unclear, the Sixth Circuit's narrow
interpretation in Carroll is inconsistent with the plain meaning of that section,
which if read as a whole, does not list registered or certified mail as a require-
ment for application of relief for the taxpayer.
Also, the court's decision is inconsistent with the purpose of § 7502. The
section was enacted to treat all taxpayers uniformly by providing relief from the
inequities in the mail resulting from their respective geographic locations.
Until Congress clarifies the ambiguous language of §7502 or the U.S. Su-
preme Court provides the definitive interpretation of the statute, the split in
authority between the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal will persist. Those tax-
payers residing in the second and sixth circuits will continue to suffer the bur-
den of proof if a return is lost and the taxpayer cannot produce a receipt for
registered or certified mail. Ironically, these taxpayers will continue to be vic-
tims of their own geography- just the dilemma §7502 was enacted to resolve.
NICOLE D. STANGER
compliance doctrine Cf I.R.C. § 2032A (d)(3)(B) (1994) which includes substantial comp-
liance language allowing a taxpayer reasonable period of time (not exceeding 90 days)
after notification of deficient filing for correction.
[Vol. 30:3
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 30 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol30/iss3/7
